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ABSTRACT
KEVIN ROACH: Black to Blue and White to Fright: Examining the Importance of
Minority Representation for Racial Profiling in Policing
(Under the direction of Frank Baumgartner.)
What role does racial diversity in police agencies have on racially discriminatory practices?
This paper will focus on the link between police agency demographics and racially dis-
criminatory policing. I will argue that a more diverse police force can in fact make racial
discrimination worse. Minority officers undergo organizational socialization, a process by
which new members of an organization are taught the organization’s values in place of their
own. This process affects the link between demographic representation and policy outputs
in policing, but this effect depends on the racial composition of the jurisdiction in question,
with the effect being higher in cities with a low minority population. I will also consider the
reaction of bureaucrats who belong to a racial majority to a diversifying workplace. Minor-
ity threat theory suggests that majority group members will react negatively to a growing
minority population, increasing racial disparities. This relationship will be mediated by the
racial composition of the jurisdiction as well, with the effect being more prominent in cities
with a small minority population.
I test these arguments using a newly collected database of traffic stop outcomes, from
which I create an index for racial discriminatory practices in a given police department. I
find that the effect of increasing diversity in police forces interacts with the share of Black
population in the city they serve. In line with my expectations, I find that in cities with a
small Black population, increasing the diversity of the police force is associated with more
racial disparities; in cities with a large minority population, new minority officers have
no effect on racial disparities. I then discuss the implications of these findings and future
avenues of research.
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INTRODUCTION
After the shooting of Michael Brown, the tenuous relationship between minority com-
munities and the police was thrust back onto the national agenda. One of the many stories
that came out of the unrest that followed talked about the peculiarities of the racial compo-
sition of the Ferguson Police Department: despite Ferguson being a primarily Black city,
the police department was comprised of primarily White officers. Some wondered if a more
demographically representative police force would have had the same racial problems. But
Ferguson is not the only police force to have problematic race relations, nor is it the only
police force to under-represent minorities in its community. What role does racial diversity
in policing have in other cities with racially discriminatory practices? This paper will focus
on the link between police agency demographics and racially discriminatory policing. I will
argue that a more diverse police force can in fact make racial disparities worse in a police
force.
Researchers have often focused on the connection between demographics and behavior
in the bureaucracy. Previous research has examined the link between the demographics
of governmental agencies and the outputs for minorities. Many authors have found that
minority bureaucrats use their discretion in order to produce outputs in favor of fellow
minority constituents (Selden 1997, Meier 1993, Thompson 1996, Keiser and Meier 2002,
Meier and Cotty 2006). Work that is more recent has examined under which conditions
a minority bureaucrat can influence bureaucratic outputs (Thompson 1976, Wilkins and
Williams 2008).
While scholars have given this topic a great deal of attention, they have not focused as
much on what mediates this relationship, specifically when would an increase in minority
representation not lead to an increase in active representation? One potential mediating fac-
tor is organizational socialization, which changes an individual’s behavior, diminishing the
effects of their demographic background on their decisions. Organizational socialization
is the process by which recruits in an organization are inducted into the norms and culture
of their new workplace, effectively wiping away their personal experience in favor of the
organizationally encouraged qualities and worldviews. Scholarly work on the subject has
suggested police is a bureaucracy with a high degree of organizational socialization, and
therefore a larger share of minorities in the force should have no effect on racially discrimi-
natory policing (Wilkins and Williams 2008). Scholars have also given little attention to the
response of majority group members to a more diverse workplace. We know from minority
threat theory that majority group members could react negatively to increasing diversity. I
will examine both of these mediating factors as applied to police work.
I will argue that organizational socialization does affect the link between demographic
representation and policy outputs in policing, but this effect depends on the racial compo-
sition of the jurisdiction in question. In cities with a small minority population, minority
officers are inducted into a force with a predisposition towards racial discrimination, and
will feel the need to overcompensate to prove their organizational commitment to a central
tenet of their workplace; this will translate into an increase in racial discrimination with an
increase in minority representation in the force. In high minority population cities, minor-
ity officers are inducted into a culture that is less prone to racial discrimination, and will
therefore feel no need to overcompensate. This would mean that minority officers will act
in the same manner as their majority colleagues, and minority representation will have no
effect on racial discrimination by the police force.
I will also consider the reaction of bureaucrats who belong to a racial majority to a
diversifying workplace, something minority representation scholars have given very little
attention to. Minority threat theory suggests that majority group members will react neg-
atively to a growing minority population, which means that majority group members in a
more diverse police force will be more racially discriminatory. This relationship will be
mediated by the racial composition of the jurisdiction. Police forces in cities with a large
share of minority population may also be subject to a self-selection mechanism, whereby
officers who are threatened by racial minorities do not choose to work in these cities. White
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officers in cities with a large minority population will already be threatened by the city’s
population, and will feel no extra threat from a diversifying police force. Furthermore, even
if they do feel more threatened, greater power minorities have in cities where they comprise
a larger share of the population should neutralize the potential for increased discrimination
coming from the officers.
I test these arguments using a newly collected database of traffic stop outcomes, from
which I create an index for racial discriminatory practices in a given police department.
While traffic stops do not cover all police-civilian contacts, they are an extremely routine
encounter that represents the vast majority of police-civilian interactions. This research
will also depart from the norm of investigating traffic stop rates, and investigate traffic stop
search rates, solving some methodological problems associated with the former method.
This methodology allows me to reliably measure racially discriminatory policies in the
everyday functions of police forces. This dataset covers a broad variety of police agencies,
allowing me to investigate variance in agency level characteristics, something many studies
of minority representation which focus on individual agencies are unable to do. I find that
the effect of increasing diversity in police forces interacts with the share of the population
in the city they serve that is Black. In line with my expectations, I find that in cities with a
small Black population, increasing the diversity of the police force is associated with more
racial disparities; in cities with a large minority population, new minority officers have
no effect on racial disparities. I then discuss the implications of these findings and future
avenues of research.
Minority Representation
Existing Literature
The bureaucratic representation literature distinguishes between two types of represen-
tation: passive and active. Passive representation refers to having shared demographic char-
acteristics, such as race or gender, between the bureaucrats and the clientele they serve
(Mosher 1968). Early bureaucratic representation literature examined the demographic
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similarity between governmental agencies and their clientele, generally focusing on how
minorities were over or under represented in these institutions (Cayar and Siegelman 1980,
Cornwell and Kellough 1994, Hall and Salsein 1975, Kellough and Elliot 1992). This early
literature did not measure the policy outputs of these agencies, taking it for granted that
more minority representation would lead to better policy outputs for minorities.
Later works directly examined active representation, when bureaucracies produces pol-
icy outputs that benefit those individuals that are passively represented (Meier 1993). The
literature has defined two requirements for active representation: bureaucrats must have dis-
cretion so that they can actually alter policy outputs for those that they passively represent
(Meier 1993) and the policy area must be salient for the minority group in question (Meier
1993, Selden 1997). The subject matter and organizations in question, racially discrimi-
natory practices in policing (and more specifically during traffic stops), firmly meet both
criteria. First, police officers are the quintessential street-level bureaucrats, meaning they
are given wide discretion in how they do their jobs (Lipsky 1980). Officers decide whom to
pull over, whom to search, and whom to give a warning instead of a ticket. There are many
opportunities for minority officers to change the outcomes in favor of minority drivers; they
could give them lighter outcomes or avoid searching them at higher rates than their White
counterparts, or even avoid stopping them in the first place. Second, the importance of racial
discrimination to the minority community is paramount. Scholars have documented how
disparate policing influences minority opinions of the police (Cochran and Warren 2012,
Weitzer and Tuch 2002), and recent social movement such as Black Lives Matter and the
civil unrest in cities such as Ferguson and Baltimore show how important this issue is to
minority group members.
The active representation literature has primarily focused on the representation along
race and ethnic and gender identities, most works demonstrating that minority bureaucrats
(either women or racial/ethnic minorities) produce better policy outputs for said minori-
ties (Selden 1997, Meier 1993, Thompson 1996, Keiser and Meier 2002, Meier and Cotty
2006). These works generally argue that a sense of shared identity or a better understand-
ing of minority needs leads minority bureaucrats to understand minority preferences better
4
than their White colleagues. These bureaucrats take this sensitivity towards minority pref-
erences, in combination with their discretion in how they go about doing their job, and use
it to actually produce policy outputs that meet these preferences (at least more so than their
White colleagues). In the context of police officers, scholars have demonstrated that an in-
crease in the number of female officers is connected to an increased focus on sexual assault
an issue perceived as more salient for women, affirming the bureaucratic representation the-
ory (Meier 2006). This literature would lead us to agree with the general notion that arose
out of Ferguson: a more diverse police force would be associated with a decrease in racial
disparities.
A New Perspective: Organization Socialization
However, it may not be as simple as the minority representation literature would sug-
gest, the relationship between passive and active representation may not always work this
way. In fact, there may be situations where minority bureaucrats produce negative outcomes
for their minority clientele. Some scholars have begun to examine what mediates the rela-
tionship between passive and active representation, arguing that institutional characteristics
can alter this link (Thompson 1976, Wilkins and Williams 2008). One characteristic of
particular importance to policing is organizational socialization, the process by which new
members of an organization are schooled into adopting the norms of that organization. The
organizational theory literature argues that administrators are socialized into their organi-
zation’s goals and norms, eliminating any personal effect their background may have on
their decision-making (Downs 1967, Gawthorn 1969, Meine and Nigre 1976, Simon 1957,
Thompson 1976). This process ensures that administrative decisions do not deviate from
organizational goals. Organizational socialization does not only apply to administrators,
however, it also affects regular employees. Employees are pressured to adopt the organi-
zational worldview for personal or career reasons, casting aside their previous worldview
in favor of the organization’s in order to fit the mold and improve their chances at rising
in the organization (Downs 1967, Romzek 1990, Simon 1957). In essence, organizational
socialization eliminates any personal factors that would affect decision-making in an or-
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ganization, wiping away the effects of things such as demographic characteristics. This
would lead us to expect that in organizations with a high degree of organizational socializa-
tion passive representation would not lead to active representation.
Police certainly fit the organizational socialization pattern: they have a well-documented
social cohesion (Hahn 1971, Wilkins and Williams 2008). The processes surrounding cur-
rent forms of racial profiling have also been institutionalized to a surprisingly high degree
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Warren 2009). Operation Pipeline, a federal program in the 1980’s
which helped transform traffic stop practices of the local law enforcement agencies, is cred-
ited as a major factor in the construction of current forms of racial profiling. This program
helped local agencies to create drug courier profiles, which allowed them to determine who
needed to be searched for drugs. These profiles were often times connected to race, either
overtly or covertly (Tomaskovic-Devey and Warren 2009). Other research has also demon-
strated how widespread these practices are in policing today: while agencies vary in how
much they racially profile, the practice is present in almost all agencies (Baumgartner et al
forthcoming, Price 2004). These practices are not ubiquitous, but we should expect police
agencies to pressure new recruits into accepting some racial profiling practices, as the latter
are an institutionalized part of modern policing.
When examining the link between organizational socialization and the practice of racial
profiling in policing, there is one article of note that directly investigates this relationship -
Wilkins and Williams (2008) piece Black or Blue: Racial Profiling and Representative Bu-
reaucracy. Wilkins and Williams described some of the organizational socialization pres-
sures that operate on officers, convincingly showing that officers do face a pressure to adhere
to institutional goals and norms. They even documented the specific pressures on minority
officers to conform: minority officer told them in interviews Sometimes you have to do
some degree of it [profiling] because that’s one of the instincts that we have and that we
pick up over the years if you stay in it [policing professions] long enough” and It [profiling]
is not only White officers. It’s Black officers, tooI think we bought into the thought process
of other people about our own people” (657). While these were only two of the responses
in their interviews, it demonstrates how powerful organizational socialization is to minority
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officers, and how practices of racial profiling are being reinforced. Wilkins and Williams
argued that organizational socialization acts as a pressure to nullify the effect of minority
officers on the policy output process, by removing the personal link minority bureaucrats
have to minority groups and making minority officers act like existing members (Wilkins
and Williams 2008). They also argued there may be a pressure on minority officers to over-
commit to the agency’s norms, meaning minority officers could actually make things worse
for their Black clientele, thought this is not the main argument of the paper. Furthermore,
the authors found that an increase in minority bureaucrats was actually associated with an
increase in racial bias, the opposite of the expectation from bureaucratic representation the-
ory and their own expectation of no effect. This finding is extremely interesting, it suggests
there could be negative consequences to minority representation that scholars have not fully
considered.
But how does organizational socialization make minority officers act worse than their
White counterparts? While this literature demonstrates that agency norms and goals are
very important when considering how new officers will act, it has not considered how or-
ganizational socialization’s effect may differ depending on the specific agency culture. The
socialization’s pressures of some agencies could push minority representatives towards neg-
atively interacting with fellow minorities, as they are forced to prove their commitment to
the cause to other organization members, above and beyond of what is expected from other
officers. While Wilkins and Williams offer this over-commitment mechanism, they do not
explain what may cause an officer to feel the need to over-commit to an agency’s racial dis-
crimination norms. This research will augment the organizational socialization literature by
considering how the pressure to over-commit to an agency’s culture may vary structurally.
It will also seek to re-conceptualize organizational socialization as a set of pressures, which
may be applied unequally to the members.
The Majority Reaction: Minority Threat Theory
The bureaucratic representation literature has also given very little attention to the ma-
jority’s reactions to a more diverse workplace. Given minority bureaucrats are not a large
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part of the bureaucracy, the majority of policy outputs are still determined by majority mem-
bers. Therefore, the aggregate effect of increased minority representation may depend on
the reactions of the vast majority of officers to having more minority colleagues. Minority
Threat theory suggests that majority members feel threatened by minority group members,
and use their disproportionally large share of power to repress the minority group when
threatened (Blalock 1967). This literature generally measures minority threat as the share of
the population, where a large minority population is more threatening than a smaller minor-
ity population. Multiple studies have demonstrated that a larger minority population leads
to negative outcomes for minorities (Huff and Stahura 1980, King and Wheelock 2007,
Chiricos et al 1997). This is the second possible explanation for Wilkins and Williams’
interesting finding: racial disparities were worse in divisions with more minorities because
the majority officers were acting with more bias in reaction to their diversifying workplace.
This research will suggest that minority threat theory is a useful guide for examining how
majority group members will react to a diversifying workplace, but will also examine how
minority populations in the city surrounding the police force can remove this effect.
Integrating organizational pressures and majority reactions
In this section, I will present a theory of minority representation that incorporates or-
ganizational socialization pressures, as well as the reaction of the racial majority officers,
for the case of police. While I expect minority officers to have a predisposition towards
producing policy outputs in favor of minorities, the pressures they face to over-conform, as
well as a negative reaction by their White colleagues will engender a negative effect, acting
in the opposite direction to what traditional minority representation theory predicts. This
effect will be dependent on the racial composition of the city the police operate within. As
a result, in cities with a small minority population, increasing minority diversity in policing
will result in overall racial disparities worsening. In cities with a large minority population
increasing minority representation will result in no effect in racial disparity levels.
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Mechanism 1: Organizational Socialization and the Pressure to Over-Commit
When considering the effects that training and organizational structure may have on
the decision making of the employees, it is useful to have a basic understanding of police
training in the United States. After all, in order for new recruits to be pressured into an or-
ganization’s mindset, the organization needs to have the training procedures to accomplish
this task, and methods of reinforcing this mindset once it has been taught. The Bureau of
Justice Statistics conducts a survey of law enforcement training academies. This survey
demonstrates that police training is generally taught by other police officers, and is exten-
sive (Reaves 2016). Nearly three quarters of law enforcement academies required that their
instructors have a minimum number of years in the force, averaging at about 4 years. The
average academy’s non-field training segment last for about 806 hours, or about 21 weeks.
However, in the field training is the most likely culprit for inducing the organizational so-
cialization effect. The report states directly that field training provides recruits with the
opportunity to work with a field training officer in order to learn the practical aspects of
law enforcement and community service, and to assimilate into the professional culture of
a particular agency” (4). While only 37 percent of academies required a field training pro-
gram, most hiring agencies conducted the field training themselves, so that about 95% of
all police officers receive field training (this number varies slightly depending on the type
of police agency), intended to assimilate them into the agencies’ professional culture. This
survey demonstrates that police officers go through an extensive level of training which is
overseen by current police officers, either in the field or in the classroom. After training, of-
ficers are subject to a high level of inter-occupational solidarity and fraternity an resistance
to change, further reinforcing the pressure for officers to commit to organizational norms
(Dicker 1998, Hahn 1971, Williams and Wilkins 2008). That is why I argue, like the lit-
erature before me has, that police officers go through a powerful process of organizational
socialization, as they are taught to police the way the current officers do and maintain that
worldview. Furthermore, as the literature has suggested and Williams and Wilkins found in
their interviews, racial profiling is an integral part of the policing culture that is impressed
on new officers.
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However, while there are certainly pressures on officers to adopt the police agency’s
norms and culture, there are reasons to think these pressures would not apply to all offi-
cers equally. Particularly, when considering attitudes towards racial profiling, is there a
reason to think incoming minority officers may face different pressures than their White
counterparts? I will argue that minority officers face an additional pressure: they need to
overcome suspicions that they would treat minorities favorably. If it seems intuitive that
minority bureaucrats will treat their minority clientele favorably and avoid racially profil-
ing them, then we should expect that majority police officers find this intuitive as well, and
would have an expectation that minority officers would not conform to agency norms. This
expectation creates a barrier for minority officers, as they need to prove their loyalty to the
agency’s norms and culture, but are expected to be resistant to said norms and culture given
their demographic characteristics. This gives minority officers an incentive to overcommit
to racial profiling: in order to ward off perceptions that they will be lenient, they will give
other officers no reason to question their loyalty to the force’s norms. As a general rule, if
that mechanism were at work, we would expect individuals in occupations with high degree
of organizational socialization, who are perceived as unable to conform to organizational
norms, to over-commit to those norms. In terms of racial profiling norms in policing specif-
ically, in agencies with a strong racial profiling culture, we should see minority officers
pressured to over-commit to racial profiling, making racial disparities worse as the force
diversifies.
I argue that a culture of racial profiling can be approximated using the racial demograph-
ics of the city in which the police force operates. I begin by assuming that police agencies
do not want to face public backlash against their policies, particularly as it regards racial
discrimination. I then argue that large minority populations are more influential and can
cause a larger backlash: if they are targeted too much, they can organize to change the way
the police operate, or use their electoral power to pressure local leaders to do so on their
behalf. Scholars have demonstrated that police agencies are cognizant of the political and
social climate when determining how much to profile, they found political attention does
affect the decision by police agencies to engage in racial profiling practices (Warren and
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Tomaskovic-Devey 2009) Therefore, all else equal, larger minority population would mean
higher probability and larger scale of a potential backlash. Ferguson is a prime example
of a large minority population that mobilized in the face of perceived racial profiling, these
demonstrations being detrimental to the standing of the Ferguson Police Department. Sum-
ming up, police agencies in areas with large minority population need to fear a backlash for
using racial profiling to a larger extent, meaning, all else equal, they should rely on racial
profiling less than agencies in areas with small minority population.
This argument should be observable in my test: cities with a larger minority population
should, all else equal, be less likely to engage in racial profiling. If this is true, then the
effect of adding minorities to a police force interacts with the share of the city population
that is comprised of minorities. We should expect that adding minorities to police force in
small minority cities will increase racial disparities, as these new minority officers need to
overcommit to racial profiling to prove their commitment to an important agency norm and
practice. Meanwhile, adding minorities to police forces in large minority cities will have no
effect on racial disparities, as racial profiling is not an important tenet for the agency, and
minority officers will not need to prove their loyalty. They will face socialization pressures
to act like everyone else, just not as much as in agencies where racial profiling is used more.
In summary, organizational socialization is a process that takes recruits with a prefer-
ence for certain methods of decision making and alters them so they fit the organization’s
methods of decision making. The training for police officers is extensive, and almost always
includes field training with an existing officer, which is intended to socialize the recruit into
the professional culture of the police agency. This demonstrates that police agencies do
indeed have a large capacity for organizational socialization. We also have seen from inter-
views that racial profiling is a part of the police culture which recruits are pressured to adopt.
However, socialization pressures are not equally applied to all recruits: those perceived to
be less likely to adhere to the agency’s norms would need to over-commit to them in or-
der to prove their loyalty. In terms of racial profiling, minority officers will be perceived
as being less likely to target minorities, and therefore need to target them more in order
to prove their resolve. I have also argued that this effect depends on the value the agency
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places on the use of racial profiling. If the agency values racial profiling, and engages in
the practice to a large extent, they will expect their officers to adhere to this value more
than agencies where racial profiling is not as central to policing practices. I then argued
that the value an agency places on racial profiling can be approximated using the demo-
graphics of the city which the agency resides in. Agencies in cities with a large minority
population need to fear a backlash for engaging in racial profiling, like the one observed in
Ferguson. This culminates in an expectation of interaction: the effect of adding minorities
to police agencies depends on the cities’ demographics. In large minority population cities,
adding minority officers will have no effect as organizational socialization wipes these offi-
cers of their demographic preferences. In small minority population cities, adding minority
officers creates an increase in racial profiling, as minority officers double down on racial
profiling practices to prove their commitment to an important practice in their agency that
the coworkers perceive them as being less likely to follow.
Mechanism 2: Minority Threat and Majority Reaction
The theory presented so far only concerns the actions of new minority officers in a police
force. However, according a survey conducted by the DOJ, LEMAS (Law Enforcement
Management and Administrative Statistics), the average police department employs about
80% White officers. Thus far, I, and other minority representation scholars, have assumed
that White officers (or more generally bureaucrats) do not act any differently when their
agency becomes more diverse. If their decision-making were constant then any aggregate
change in racial profiling indicators would be the result of the actions of the new minority
officers. However, it is entirely possible that members of racial majorities would react to a
diversifying agency, and the changes in racial profiling indicators could be a result of their
reactions.
I argue, in line with minority threat theory, that majority officers will experience an in-
creased perception of racial threat when minority representation increases. While minority
threat theorists normally examine police officers as tools of minority repression when a city
becomes threatened, the same processes should operate on police officers themselves. Mi-
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nority representation in policing means more minority colleagues for White officers, and
the same processes that make homeowners think crime is worse when their neighborhood
diversifies, will operate at the workplace level (Chiricos et al 1997). Minority presence
not only increases perceptions of negative stereotypes associated with minorities, it also
makes majority members more punitive (King and Wheelock 2007). This means majority
officers could have their negative perceptions of racial minorities highlighted, and have an
increased probability of deciding to punish a representative of a racial minority. Given the
vast discretion these officers have in who they select for investigation and when to pun-
ish, an increased perceived threat of racial minorities or punitive intent could very easily
translate into negative consequences for minorities the officers interact with.
However, much like the organizational socialization effect earlier, there are reasons to
think the effect minority threat has on racial profiling practices in policing may vary sys-
tematically with city demographics. First, the selection of officers who work in a given
jurisdiction is not random: officers choose which departments they would like to work in.
If an officer is a person who is particularly threatened by large minority populations, I ex-
pect them to choose to work in cities where they will not constantly be interacting with a
large minority population. This assumes these individuals do not seek out a feeling of being
threatened. This selection effect would produce agencies in small minority towns that are
comprised of officers who are more threatened by minority populations, and agencies in
large minority towns that are more resistant to minority threat effects. Second, I expect the
same political/social power dynamic that was described earlier to be present. If large mi-
nority populations are more capable in detecting and punishing racial discrimination, then
we could expect a political constraint on the decision making of majority group members.
While majority officers may feel threatened because of a large minority population, they are
not able to act on this perception of threat due to a fear of backlash. A third reason would
be that majority officers working in large minority jurisdictions are already threatened by
the large minority population they interact with on a day to day basis, and there simply is
not as much room to go up in terms of perceived racial threat. All three effects have the
same empirical signature: in cities with a small minority population, a diversifying police
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force is met with increased perceptions of racial threat and worsening racial disparities. In
cities with large minority populations, this effect is stymied, and increasing diversity comes
with no change in majority officer behavior.
While both mechanisms predict the same aggregate effect, their particular empirical
signatures would be slightly different. The organizational socialization effect would be
produced by minority officers, while the majority reaction effect would be produced by
majority officers. It is theoretically possible to separate these effects by measuring the
differences in policy outputs by race of the officer. This would require micro level data,
which records the outcome of each traffic stop by officer, and most importantly would need
to contain information on the officer’s race. Unfortunately, this is not possible with current
data sources. This research will provide evidence of the described effects in the aggregate,
which would be evidence for either or both mechanisms.
Hypotheses
The following are my formal hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 All else equal, cities with larger minority populations will have lower
racial disparities.
According to both mechanisms, we should observe a lower level of racial profiling in
large minority population cities. The first mechanism specifies that large minority popu-
lations would have the political and social power to cause a backlash which would make
police agencies think twice about going overboard. In the second part of my theory, I of-
fered a selection mechanism and a political explanation for why cities with large minority
populations would not experience a minority threat effect. Both mechanisms would require
that these cities, all else equal, also rely on racial profiling less than cities without a large
minority population.
Hypothesis 2 All else equal, as minority representation in the force increases, the level
of racial disparities will increase.
Hypothesis 3 The effect of adding minority officers will approach 0 as the minority
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population in the city increase.
The second and third hypotheses describe the interactive effect offered in both mecha-
nisms presented in my theory. Both suggested that minority representation should lead to a
negative effect - either though minority over-commitment or majority backlash. They also
both gave a mechanism by which we should expect this to only be the case in cities with
a small minority population, as with the minority population increased this effect would
become stymied, until it dropped to a null effect.
Data and model
Dependent Variable
For the purposes of this study, I will focus on African Americans as the racial minority.
In order to test the effect that minority representation will have on racial profiling practices
I need to measure the level of racial profiling in a police agency. Like several works before
me, I will investigate traffic stop encounters between the police and civilians. Traffic stop
encounters may not be as newsworthy as police shootings, but they are the most common
method of police civilian interaction (Either and Durose 2008). For this reason, if we want
to examine whether the police are racially profiling individuals, it is useful to examine traffic
stops, as due to their routine nature they will be more representative of average police
work. I will depart from the existing studies and not examine traffic stop rates, due to
methodological concerns. While it is certainly substantively important to know if the police
are stopping racial minorities more, examinations of traffic stop rates are plagued by the
inability to know who the officer could have selected for a traffic stop (the initial pool the
officer is choosing from). In order to know if officers are selecting minorities more for
traffic stops we would need to know what is the pool of drivers who are on the road at the
time of the stop and are breaking the law - a nearly impossible feat. Scholars normally
get around this concern by estimating what the driving population looks like and assuming
(with some survey evidence to support the claim) that drivers of different races break the law
at about the same rate. While scholars have found interesting ways to attempt to circumvent
15
the limitations of examining traffic stop rates, I will focus on the outcomes of these traffic
stops, namely the decision to search an individual. This is methodologically useful, as
a person can only be searched if they have been stopped, which means I can know the
full pool of drivers who could have been searched, and deduce whether minority drivers
were selected for search more than White drivers. These searches are also substantively
important: they are involved affairs that worsen the driver’s perceptions of the officer’s
handling of the situation, and as scholars have argued, have other negative consequences
not associated with just being stopped by the police (Lankton and Durose 2011, Either and
Durose 2008, Epp et al. 2014).
I construct a search rate ratio to measure disparities in traffic stop search processes.
Simply put, this is the search rate for Black drivers divided by the search rate for White
drivers, where both rates are the number of searches divided by the number of stops for that
racial group.
Black Search Rate Ratio= (Black Searches/Black Stops) / (White Searches/White Stops)
This measure can be interpreted in the following manner: if the search rate ratio is above
one, minorities are being searched at a higher rate than White drivers, if the search rate ratio
is below one then minorities are searched at a lower rate than White drivers. The higher this
measure goes, the more disparate minority searches rates becomes in reference to White
search rates: a search rate ratio of two means Blacks are searched at twice the rate of White
drivers, whereas a search rate ratio of three means Blacks are searched at three times the rate
of White drivers. This measure is useful because it inherently compares minority drivers to
their White counterparts, meaning I am directly measuring racial disparities in traffic stop
search processes. The measure is also useful because it uses rates rather than frequencies:
this avoids punishing agencies that have pulled over more minorities, as they will have
more stops in which to conduct a search on. For this measure and all other variables in this
data, race and ethnicity are measured in a mutually exclusive fashion. An individual is only
considered White or Black if they are not ethnically Hispanic. An individual is coded as
Hispanic if they are ethnically Hispanic, regardless of race.
This measure is constructed using a new traffic stops dataset created in collabora-
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tion with Frank Baumgartner (UNC) and Leah Christiani (UNC). This dataset includes
all known records of traffic stops in the United States from 2000 on, so long as they include
the number of stops, the number of searches, for the agencies that are above a 10,000 stops
per year threshold. It records the number of stops and searches for a given police agency
in a given year, by driver’s race. The number of stops per year threshold was imposed for
data reliability - given this research uses stop rates, the 10,000 threshold makes sure the
denominator in the rate is not so small that it is unreliable. This will bias my data towards
large agencies, however other data availability restricts the data in this way anyway, and
the implications of this bias will be discussed in the discussion section. This data includes
reports published by police agencies (or other governmental bodies) which record yearly
totals, as well as totals constructed from micro level (that is individual stop records) reports
published in some states. This data includes sheriffs, local police departments, and state
police. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the search rate ratio measure across our
dataset (for those observations that are included in the final test), as well as the descriptive
statistics for the other variables in the model. This shows that on average police agencies
searches minority drivers nearly 3 times as much as White drivers; furthermore, only two
agency years registered below one, meaning they searched Whites more than they searched
Blacks.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Black Search Rate Ratio 257 2.67 1.20 0.90 7.96
Share Black in City 254 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.54
Share Black on Force 268 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.34
Segregation Index 264 38.56 14.28 10.94 82.48
% Vote for Obama 265 61.24 12.21 33.19 84.34
100,000 Residents 254 1.83 4.22 0.07 28.24
Share in Poverty 254 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.33
Officer per 100,000 residents 254 205.53 138.04 104.07 1335.88
Share of CPO officers 264 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.81
Crime Rate 192 3497.46 1908.38 932.49 8491.05
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Independent Variables
The main explanatory variables for this research will be the share of the city population
and the police force that are Black. The demographics of the city are collected from the
American Communities Survey, and are specific to the city in which the police agency op-
erates. The average share of the Black population in the cities in this data is about 16%, but
ranges from near 0, up to 54%, giving me very good variance in terms of city demographics.
Police force demographics are collected using the Law Enforcement Management and Ad-
ministrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey run by the Department of Justice. LEMAS surveys
all police agencies with more than 100 sworn officers, and includes a nationally represen-
tative sample of smaller agencies, with a high response rate. This will unfortunately bias
the availability of force demographics data towards large agencies, the implications of this
will be also discussed in the discussion section. This research looks at four iterations of
LEMAS: 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2013. Other iterations were not considered because they
did not correspond to the time-frame the dependent variable was collected on. From these
four iterations, a force profile was set up for each agency, which included its demographic
profile for each iteration of the survey it was included in. It was apparent at this step that
force demographics rarely change: police officers are not temporary workers, they remain
in the profession for a long time. The average change from one iteration of LEMAS (an
average of about 4 years) to another was about one Black officer, hardly enough to gather
meaningful variance. For this reason, force demographics are treated as a unit constant, an
average of their demographic for each LEMAS survey that contained information about the
force. This is a potentially strong limitation: I do not have information about the changing
demographics of all the forces in my dataset. Given the sporadic nature of LEMAS, and the
relative stability of force demographics, this is a necessary limitation that is not imposing
very much on the structure of the data. I will instead focus on differences in demographics
between agencies.
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Control variables
I will control for 6 different variables: segregation, ideology, city size, poverty, officer
to citizen ratio, and crime rates. Geographic segregation may influence search-rate dis-
parities. Scholars have suggested that police beats that are less diversified lead to more
racial disparities in traffic stops (Roh and Robbinson 2009). Therefore, police forces in
highly segregated cities, which should consist of less diversified beats, may be more prone
to racial profiling than those in more racially integrated areas. The expectation is that as
segregation increases, the racial disparities in traffic stop search rates will increase as well.
Racial segregation will be measured using the standard dissimilarity index, which measures
what percentage of the population in a city would need to move in order to achieve even
racial dispersion. Each city is assigned a 0-100 score, a value of 100 being maximum seg-
regation while a value of 0 is maximum integration. I gathered this measure from Brown’s
American Communities project (Logan 2017).
Ideology is a useful control because it should measure political pressures on the police
to refrain from racial profiling. According to a Pew survey, self-identified Democrats were
less likely to say police officers were treating racial minorities fairly - 26% as compared
to 78% for Republicans (Brown 2017). Given this, I expect that the local government and
citizenry in more Democratic places will be less tolerant of racial profiling, so we should
expect police agencies in these jurisdictions to engage in less racial profiling. Ideology
will be measured as the percent vote share for Obama in 2008, a general measure used in
the literature. This measure is unfortunately tied to the county instead of the city, because
of data restrictions; implications for this will be discussed in the discussion section. It
could be also argued that police agencies in large cities rely on racial profiling more than
those in smaller cities. Cities are associated with anonymity: officers in large cities have
less information to go on when interacting with civilians so they rely on racial cues more.
There are also important cultural differences between urban and rural centers that should be
controlled for. City size is measured as the number of citizens in 100,000s, collected from
the American Communities Survey.
The literature has consistently identified poverty levels as an important factor when
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looking at racial disparities in policing (Cox et al 2001; Fagan and Davies 2000; Smith and
Petrocelli 2001). The general conception of this relationship is that police target individuals
who are not capable of fighting back, the impoverished. This leads me to expect that as
poverty rates increase, racial profiling will become more pronounced. I will control for
poverty using the poverty statistics provided by the American Communities Survey (Census
2015).
It may also be important to measure the concept of over policing, measured as the num-
ber of officers per capita. Agencies with a high officer/citizen ratio may be more zealous
in the attempt to control crime; this could lead them to engage in more racial profiling than
agencies with a lower officer/citizen ratio. It could be counter argued that officers in agen-
cies with a low officer/citizen ratio have higher demands placed on them, and need to rely
on racial profiling to handle the increased workload. This control was constructed using
officer totals from LEMAS and city size from the ACS. In the same lens, I will control for
crime rates, which as scholars have suggested lead to racial disparities in policing (Fagan
and Garth 2000). The logic here is that as crime rates increase, the police will react by
increased racial profiling as a response. This is collected from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Report (UCR), combining both violent and property crimes. This measure covers all crime
collected by the UCR, including murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The crime rate measures how
many of the specified crimes occur per 100,000 population.
Missing data
The original traffic stop outcomes dataset had 781 agency years, spanning from 2000 to
2016, and 208 different police agencies from 18 different states. The amount of coverage
over time depended on the agency, some agencies only reported for one year, other reported
over the whole period. Table 2 summarizes the loss of data. 214 observations were dropped
due to not being included in any of the four LEMAS surveys examined. 222 observations
were lost when including the ACS estimates for city demographics, as these estimates were
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only available in a usable format 1 from 2009 and on. Restricting the data to only local
police departments constrained the data to include only 238 agency years from 64 agencies.
Including the crime rates further restricted the time frame, to 2009 to 2014. This resulted
in 50 observations lost, including losing 17 agencies (which had only reported these final
years) for a final total of 182 agency years from 47 agencies.
Table 2: Missing Data
Restriction Observations Observations Lost
Starting 781
LEMAS 567 214
ACS Estimates 345 222
Exclusing non local PDs 238 107
Crime Rate 192 46
Model
Given the use of a pooled dataset, OLS regression would not be a reliable method of
estimation. In particular, the presence of unit effects in the data could strongly bias my
independent variables that do not vary over time. Given a major independent variable, force
demographics, is held as a unit constant, this would bias a major theoretically important
variable. Given this, I will use a pooled time series model with random effects to test the
following model:
Black Search Rate Ratio= Share Black City + Share Black Force + Share Black
City* Share Black Force + Segregation Index + Percent Obama + City Size + % in Poverty
+ Officer per 100,000 citizens + Crime Rate
This model will use the police agency as the unit and year as the time variable. Since I
am interested in the differences between agencies, I cannot use fixed effects to correct for
unit effects, therefore I will use random effects that will control for unit effects that were
not included in the model.
1 This limitation is due to the lack of earlier datasets on the Census API server
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Analysis and results
Table 3: Model Predicting Black Search Rate Ratio
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 1- Restricted Model 2
Share Black in City -1.409 -2.068 -2.380
(1.200) (1.710) (1.765)
Share Black in Force 16.235*** 17.290*** 17.550***
(3.327) (4.220) (4.273)
Black in City * Black in Force -33.282*** -34.394*** -34.829***
(9.326) (12.822) (12.961)
Segregation 0.017** 0.014 0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
% Obama 0.024*** 0.028** 0.030**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
City Size 0.036 -0.115 -0.146
(0.032) (0.094) (0.101)
% in Poverty -1.803 0.247 -0.118
(1.795) (2.569) (2.619)
Officer per 100,000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Crime Rate 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.479 0.386 0.473
(0.674) (0.948) (0.962)
Observations 248 188 188
Number of Agencies 67 48 48
R-Square:Within 0.01 0.00 0.00
R-Square: Between 0.51 0.39 0.39
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 shows the results of the pooled time series regression. Model 1 includes every
control besides the crime rate. I also restricted the first model to only those observations
that the crime rate was not missing for, this should demonstrate whether any differences
between Model 1 and Model 2 are due to data loss or are a result of the added crime rate
control. Model 2 reports the results with the crime rate control included. Model 1 has a
within R-squared of .01 and a between R-squared of .51, showing that this model explains
almost no within-unit variance in the agencies, but does a fairly good job at explaining
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the variance between agencies. Given the lack of over time variance in one of the main
theoretical independent variables, force demographics, this was to be expected.
Fig. 1: Marginal Effects of Model 1
Due to the presence of an interaction term, the coefficients presented cannot be inter-
preted directly, instead it is necessary to use a marginal effect graph to interpret the effects
of demographics in the city and in the force. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect graph for
model 1 as the share of the force and the city that is Black varies, holding all other variables
to their mean. The different lines represent different city demographics, rising from 10% to
50% Black population, the x-axis represents the percentage of Black officers on the force,
ranging from 0% to 35%. My hypotheses predicted that cities with a larger minority pop-
ulation would have police agencies that racially profiled less, and that as the percentage of
Black officers on the force rose, so too would racial disparities, which would be observed as
an increase in the search rate ratio. However, I also predicted that this effect was contingent
on the percentage of Black population in the city: as the city became more Black, this effect
would reduce to zero.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates support for my hypotheses. First, cities with larger mi-
nority populations almost always have lower racial disparities. When the share of Black
officers in the force is low, the effect of a higher Black population is indistinguishable, but
once the Black share in the force rises, it is clear that cities with a large minority popu-
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lation are racially profiling less. This provides evidence for my claim that large minority
populations can more effectively keep police from profiling them, or at least supports the
idea that agencies in cities with a large minority population engage in racial profiling less.
This is an important finding: if larger minority cities had engaged in racial profiling more
than small minority cities, then my arguments for why these relationships depended on
city demographics would not have been supported and other mechanisms would have been
needed.
Second, all else equal, having more Black officers in a force is correlated with an in-
crease in racial disparities. However, this effect goes away as the size of a city’s Black
population increases. This is evident in the slopes of the marginal effects: when percent
Black in the city is small, these slopes are positive, indicating that more Black officers
leads to an increase in search disparities. However, the slopes of the lines decrease as the
Black share in the city increases, until eventually, there is no effect of adding Black officer
to a force. These effects are substantively large: in a 30% Black city, going from hiring no
African American officers to hiring 30% (that is hiring in parity with city demographics) re-
sults in African American drivers being searched 200% more than their White counterparts
are. Marginal effect plots for the other models are included in Appendix ..., they show no
meaningful differences from the results in Model 1. Given the large amount of data missing
in the crime rates variable, and the lack of new meaningful information, I present the results
of Model 1 alone.
Among the control variables, segregation and partisanship have statistically significant
effects, having p-values below the .05 level. Segregation has the expected sign - more seg-
regation is correlated with more racial disparities. The effect of segregation dropped out of
significance in the second model, however this is probably due to data loss, not the mean-
ingful addition of the crime rate control, because the segregation effect also disappeared in
the restricted first model. If the effect of segregation were dependent on model specification
(that is dependent on the inclusion of the crime rate control), I would expect that limiting
the dataset but no including the confounding factor would not eliminate the effect of segre-
gation on racial profiling practices. However, this is not the case, and it is the loss of data
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associated with including crime controls, which eliminates the effect of segregation. The
effect of segregation is somewhat modest, going from a score of 0 to 10, that is going from
racial integration to needing 10% of a city to move to achieve racial integration, would lead
to a .17 increase in the search rate ratio.
While partisanship had a statistically significant effect, having a p-value below the .01
level in Model 1 and below the .05 level in the other models, it was in the direction opposite
to my predictions. This means that as the vote share for Obama increased, so did racial dis-
parities. This effect is also quite large, a 10% increase in the Obama vote share is correlated
with a .2 increase in the disparity index. This means that Blacks would be searched 20%
more than Whites would, all else equal. This finding is quite puzzling. I think this result
may have to do with the presence of both percent Black in the city, city size, and partisan-
ship in the same model, which may confound the results given how highly correlated these
concepts generally are.
The other control variables - city size, poverty rate, officer/citizen ratio, and the crime
rate - were not significant in all three models, having p-values above the .05 level and .1
level.
As stated earlier, these results are not sufficient to separate the two mechanisms pro-
posed in my theory: the effects of socialization pressures on minority officers and minority
threat reactions of majority officers. My findings support the aggregate effect of either/both
of these mechanisms, namely that a more diverse force has worse racial disparities contin-
gent on city demographics. If the data were more detailed, then it would be possible to
identify if it was minority or majority officers producing the change. However, it is not
possible given the current status of traffic stop data in the United States.
Conclusion
Discussion
This project proposed a limited test for a novel theory. As stated earlier, it was not able
to separate out the organizational socialization effect from the majority reaction effect, due
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to a lack of necessary data. Furthermore, the sample of agencies in my data was biased
towards large agencies. This limits the exportability of these findings; some scholars have
suggested there are important differences in perceptions of racial profiling in smaller police
agencies(Wilson Wilson and Thou 2015) Lastly, the exportability of these findings to other
bureaucracies may be limited; the police are a very distinct institution that has a deep history
when it concerns troubled relationships with minorities. This was also only one measure of
policy outputs towards minorities, it is highly possible that minority officers produce nice
outcomes for minorities in other facets of their job. Keeping these reservations in mind, the
test still provided interesting evidence in support of the proposed mechanisms.
One very surprising finding, beyond those proposed by the theory, was that more Demo-
cratic cities had worse racial disparities. However, it is important to note two important
caveats. First, the measure of partisanship was at the county, not city level. This is a clear
measurement error in an independent variable, which is methodologically problematic, vi-
olating an OLS assumption. I also included both voting for the Democratic candidate, city
size, and racial demographics, meaning the result is the effect of partisanship controlling for
the Black population and urbanization. In essence, this is the effect of non-Black non-urban
liberalism. Future scholars should investigate this further, to determine if this was due to
methodical error, or is a truly interesting finding that requires new explanations.
Conclusion
This research began by examining one of the many questions posed during the unrest
in Ferguson: were the racial disparities in Ferguson PD practices due to a lack of diversity
in their police department? There is a strong literature that would have suggested that a
more diverse force would have produced better outcomes for their minority citizens, but
this research project has argued it may not be as simple as that.
I examined the link between passive and active representation, asking if we could expect
minority representatives to ever act worse towards other minorities, and what is the response
of majority group members to a diversifying workplace. I hypothesized that a diversifying
workplace would be bad for minority clienteles, but only in cities with a small minority
26
population. I found support for this hypothesis. I also found limited support that more
segregation leads to more disparities, and very interestingly found that more Democratic
cities had worse racial disparities. Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, it was not possible to
separate the effect of the two mechanisms offered in this thesis with current data sources.
Yet it would be possible to test these separate effects in other fields of study besides the
police and racial disparities. Furthermore, these findings raise several important concerns
about minority representation theory, and future scholars should consider both the effect
of organizational socialization on minority representatives and the reaction of majority bu-
reaucrats. Finally, this research has shown that it is important to consider how bureaucratic
representation relationships may vary systematically between different agencies and areas.
In this study, I have shown how the effect of minority representation depends on the racial
demographics of the city.
It is important to remember that this research does not inherently suggest that hiring
minorities will lead to negative consequences for the minorities in the community served
by a given agency. It suggests that we need to consider the reactions of the majority, and
pre-empt these in order to ensure that diversifying police agencies has positive effects and
reduces racial profiling. Future research should investigate if racial bias training has any
effect on this relationship; it is the opinion of this author that they may be effective in
keeping majority officers from reacting negatively.
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APPENDIX A: Exclusion of Crime Rates
The marginal effects were only presented for Model 1 in interest of space. This Ap-
pendix will present the marginal effect plots for the restricted model and Model 2, along
with a short analysis to show these model specifications did not change the findings.
Figure 2 will present the marginal effects for the restricted model, Figure 3 will present
the marginal effects for Model 2. Both figures provide the same support for my hypotheses:
adding minority officers increases racial disparities, but as the city becomes more Black
this effect approaches zero. The only notable difference is that the confidence intervals
have become wider, due to a large restriction in data. Crime rate scores lack predictive
power and would lead to a sacrifice in data - taken together, that warrants its exclusion from
the model.
Fig. 2: Marginal Effect for Restricted Model
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Fig. 3: Marginal Effect for Model 2
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APPENDIX B: Curvilinear Effects
It could be argued that the use of a linear model is inappropriate when trying to measure
minority threat effects, which are generally curvilinear. This Appendix will demonstrate
that the main findings are robust to the inclusion of curvilinear effects, and extreme amount
of complexity added to the model is not warranted.
The curvilinear model is as follows, in the interest of space the share of the force that is
Black will be abbreviated as BF and share of the city that is Black with be abbreviated as
BC:
Black Search Rate Ratio= BC+BF+BC*BC+BF*BF+BC*BF+BC*BC*BF+
BF*BF*BC+BC*BC*BF*BF+ Segregation Index + Percent Obama + City Size +
% in Poverty + Officer per 100,000 citizens + Crime Rate
Fig. 4: Marginal Effect for Curvilinear Model
It is apparent this model is extremely complex, and the presence of multiple more than
two-way interactions makes the outputs incomprehensible. Figure 4 shows the marginal
effects of this model. The end results is roughly the same: the slope is generally positive
and decreases as the share of the city that is Black increases. This model was not chosen
for the demands it makes on relatively small dataset, and also for comprehensibility.
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